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Unclear Hostility:
Supreme Court Discussions of “Hostility to
Religion” from Barnette to American Legion
MARK SATTA†
ABSTRACT
Appeals to “hostility to religion” have been a regular part of the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence for the last eighty
years, but in all that time the Court has never provided a clear
explanation of what constitutes “hostility to religion.” This lack of
explanation has recently become increasingly troubling given the
significant role that the concept of “hostility to religion” has played
in several high-profile Supreme Court decisions within the last two
years, including Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado, Trump v.
Hawaii, and American Legion v. American Humanist Association.
In this paper, I provide a thorough and detailed history of the
Court’s appeals to “hostility to religion.” Through the lens of that
historical examination of the Court’s use of the concept of “hostility
to religion,” I argue that the Court has come to use “hostility to
religion” ambiguously to mean both the broad category of anything
that fails to be neutral toward religion and the narrower category
of specifically that which exhibits active animosity toward religion.
I argue that this ambiguity has resulted in confused outcomes and
may contribute to ratcheting up the culture wars. I further argue
that the best remedy is for the Court to be clearer and more
judicious in its appeals to “hostility to religion” going forward. I offer
four suggestions for how the Court can do so.

† My thanks to Mary Ann Glendon, Joe Singer, Nomi Stolzenberg, Mark Tushnet,
and the editors of the Buffalo Law Review for their insightful feedback on earlier
versions of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past eighty years, many of the Supreme Court’s
most influential cases concerning the First Amendment’s
protection of freedom of religion have contained at least one
statement by a justice expressing the view that something
was or was not “hostile to religion” (or some variation
thereof). However, in all of these opinions the justices have
almost never paused to clarify what they mean by “hostility
to religion.” As is often the case when a phrase is used
frequently and reflected upon seldomly, the phrase “hostility
to religion” (and cognate phrases like “hostile toward
religion,” “exhibiting religious hostility,” etc.) has meant
different things when used by different justices.1 But the
justices have routinely failed to acknowledge or account for
such discordant uses. As a result, appeals to “hostility to
religion” based on Supreme Court precedent have become
overly malleable and easily weaponized for partisan ends.
This paper seeks to clarify matters by providing (1) a detailed
history of the Court’s use of phrases like “hostility to
religion,” (2) a descriptive examination and analysis of the
ambiguous and inconsistent ways in which the Court has
used such phrases, and (3) a prescriptive account of what the
Court ought to do moving forward.
Historically, claims of hostility to religion have rarely
been determinative in the outcome of the case. But, in recent
years, that has changed. Issues over whether law-making or
law-enforcing behavior exhibits hostility toward religion
have been determinative in the outcome of several important
cases. The most recent case where the concept of “hostility to
religion” clearly determined the outcome was the 2018 case
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). In Masterpiece, the
Court vacated a Colorado Court of Appeals ruling that a

1. Throughout this paper, I will treat the phrases “hostile to religion,”
“hostility toward religion,” “religious hostility,” and similar phrases as
synonymous and interchangeable.
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baker had violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act by
refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.2 The
Court did so on the grounds that adjudicators in Colorado
had exhibited hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs
during the appeals process. That baker later sued the state
of Colorado on the basis that Colorado displayed hostility
toward his religious beliefs.3
But the concept of hostility to religion has played a
significant role in cases even more recent than Masterpiece.
Had the primary dissent in a second 2018 case, Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), been the majority, charges of
hostility toward religion would have proved determinative
for a second time in the Court’s 2018 decisions. In Hawaii,
while a majority of five upheld President Donald Trump’s
immigration restrictions placed on several Muslim majority
countries, the primary dissent, penned by Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, expressed the view that these restrictions should
be struck down on First Amendment grounds due to the
hostility Trump had displayed toward members of the
Muslim faith in advocating for his “travel ban” during his
campaign for president.4
Most recently, on June 20, 2019, in American Legion v.
American Humanist Association, the Court’s majority
appealed to the concept of hostility to religion in ruling that
the presence of a ninety-year-old World War I memorial in
the form of a 32-foot Latin cross on public land in Maryland
did not violate the Establishment Clause.5 In determining
that the cross ought to remain on public land, the majority
reasoned that taking down monuments with religious
symbolism “will strike many as aggressively hostile to
2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1732 (2018).
3. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074-WYD-STV, at
*45–46 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2019).
4. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
5. American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089
(2019).
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religion.”6
As the examination of these and other cases will show,
the Supreme Court has vacillated between two distinct
meanings of what constitutes “hostility towards religion” in
its First Amendment jurisprudence. Given the increasing
significance charges of hostility to religion are playing in the
outcomes of constitutional cases concerning religion, it is
important that this ambiguity is identified and that greater
attention be given to what is meant by “hostility to religion.”
It is also important to devote more careful reflection on what
the Court should mean by “hostility toward religion” which
heretofore has been a largely neglected topic. This paper is
an attempt to make progress toward these goals.
This paper has four theses. First, phrases like “hostility
to religion” have been used ambiguously by the Court.
Sometimes, by “hostility to religion” the justices mean
something akin to “disfavor toward religion.” At other times,
by “hostility to religion” the justices mean something akin to
“animosity toward religion.”
Second, and related to the first, due to this ambiguity,
phrases like “hostility to religion,” when used in legal
opinions, can neither accurately be described simply as
technical terms—i.e. as legal terms of art—nor can they
accurately be described as simply in keeping with the
ordinary language usage of such phrases. The Court’s
ambiguous treatment is the root of this state of affairs.
Sometimes the Court has strayed far from ordinary language
meaning of “hostility” in the context of religion and treated
“hostility” akin to a technical term. But at other points
justices have leaned into the ordinary, everyday meaning of
“hostility” in claiming that something does or does not
constitute hostility to religion.
Third, these ambiguous uses have caused confusion and
strife; both in the Court’s opinions and in the general public

6. Id. at 2084–85.
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consciousness. Fourth and finally, the best way to eliminate
this confusion is to use the phrase “hostility to religion” only
when one means “animosity toward religion” and to use other
phrases like “disfavoring religion” or “inhibiting religion” to
identify instances where actions or policies may harm or
marginalize religion, but through a means that contains no
animosity or spite toward religion.
The bulk of this paper is devoted to thoroughly covering
the history of the Supreme Court’s usage of phrases like
“hostility to religion,” “religious hostility,” and “hostile
toward religion.” Simultaneous to this presentation of the
history, I will also be making my case that the Court’s
appeals to “hostility toward religion” have been ambiguous.
I argue that this ambiguity has been harmful because (1) it
has
muddied
Supreme
Court
religious
freedom
jurisprudence, and (2) it has helped foment the culture wars
over the role of religion in the United States. I close by
offering four proposals for how to talk about hostility to
religion going forward that will help make the Court’s
jurisprudence clearer, more accurate, and more effective,
which might ultimately help ratchet down the culture wars
concerning religion’s role in America.
In this paper, I make claims about how the Court’s use
of phrases like “hostility toward religion” do or do not reflect
ordinary language usage of the word “hostility.” Thus, I
should say something about what I take the ordinary
meaning of the word “hostility” to be. I take it that the word
“hostility,” as used in everyday English, conveys a strong
negative attitude toward the object one is hostile toward.
Being hostile isn’t the sort of thing one can be casually.
Rather, hostility requires a strong commitment and
emotional opposition to the object of one’s hostility.
This understanding aligns with how lexicographers
define the words “hostile” and “hostility.” For example, the
first lexeme provided for the word “hostile” in the Oxford
English Dictionary Online is “[o]f, pertaining to, or
characteristic of an enemy; pertaining to or engaged in actual
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hostilities” and the secondary definition is “unfriendly in
feeling, action, nature, or character; contrary, adverse,
antagonistic.”7 Like most words, “hostility” contains a range
of connotations depending on the perspective of the speaker
or hearer as well as on the context of utterance. This range
is exhibited with the milder characterization of hostility as
“unfriendly in feeling” to the stronger characterizations as
“antagonistic” and “characteristic of an enemy.”
I take these stronger characterizations to predominate
in most contexts, as is evidenced by Merriam-Webster’s
definition of hostility as “deep-seated usually mutual ill will”
and as “conflict, opposition, or resistance in thought or
principle.” The synonyms Merriam-Webster provides for
“hostility” are “animosity, animus, antagonism, antipathy,
bad blood, bitterness, enmity, gall, grudge, jaundice,
rancor.”8 All these words convey strongly negative
sentiments that are held with conviction and deep feeling.
Thus, hostility as used in ordinary English is constituted by
a certain kind of intention that tends to result in actions
aimed at thwarting, undercutting, or harming the object of
hostility (both Merriam-Webster and the Oxford English
Dictionary note the connection between “hostility” and
“war”). In our examination of the differing claims of “hostility
to religion” we will see that some justices lean into the strong
negative attitude aspect of “hostility” while others seem to
treat “hostility” as referencing a much wider class of
oppositional stances one can take.

7. Hostile, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
8. Compare id. with Hostility, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam
webster.com/dictionary/hostility (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
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VIDAL TO ENGEL (1844 TO 1962)
The 1844 case Vidal v. Philadelphia is the first time a
reference of hostility to religion appears in a Supreme Court
opinion.9 In Vidal, the Court considered whether the will of
a deceased millionaire that called for his fortune to be used
to build a school for orphans, which barred “ecclesiastics,
missionaries, and ministers of any sect from holding or
exercising any station or duty in the college,” violated
Pennsylvania public policy.10 In writing for the Court,
Justice Joseph Story made a single reference to hostility in
paraphrasing the argument of the plaintiffs. Story wrote
that,
This objection is that the foundation of the college upon the
principles and exclusions prescribed by the testator, is derogatory
and hostile to the Christian religion, and so is void, as being against
the common law and public policy of Pennsylvania. 11

While Story doesn’t elaborate on what either the
plaintiffs meant by hostility or what the Court took it to
mean, he and his colleagues were unconvinced by the
plaintiff’s arguments. The Court voted unanimously that the
will did not violate public policy, mostly because of how
limited they determined the harm to Christianity to be
(Story points out that Christianity and scripture could still
be taught at the school; it simply couldn’t be taught by
teachers who were religious leaders by vocation).12
It was nearly one hundred years until another reference
to hostility to religion made its way into a Supreme Court
opinion. The concept had a rather ignoble reintroduction as
a comment in Justice Felix Frankfurter’s much criticized
dissent in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.13

9. Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. 127, 197 (1844).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 197–98.
13. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654 (1943)
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Frankfurter wrote that “[t]he essence of the religious
freedom guaranteed by our Constitution is therefore this: no
religion shall either receive the state’s support or incur its
hostility” and that “[r]eligion is outside the sphere of political
government.”14 He made these comments in service of the
following conclusion.
An act compelling profession of allegiance to a religion, no matter
how subtly or tenuously promoted, is bad. But an act promoting
good citizenship and national allegiance is within the domain of
governmental authority and is therefore to be judged by the same
considerations of power and of constitutionality as those involved in
the many claims of immunity from civil obedience because of
religious scruples.15

His claims about religion were meant to serve as a
contrast category for the point he wanted to make about
national allegiance. Frankfurter’s views about forced
expression of national allegiance have failed to make it out
of his dissent and into future majority opinions, but the
contrasting claims he made about religion represent the first
articulation in a Supreme Court opinion of a now
commonplace part of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.16
Frankfurter’s primary concern in his analogy seemed to
be that it would be unconstitutional for a religion to receive
the same kind of support from that state that he was
advocating views about national allegiance should receive.
But in doing so Frankfurter sensibly noted that, just as the
government cannot improperly put a thumb on the scale in
favor of religion, so too it cannot improperly put a thumb on
the scale against religion either. Frankfurter’s recognition
that the state can express neither support nor hostility

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 654–55.
16. I speak of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause as two
related, but separate entities. However, I don’t believe anything I say here turns
on this. One could just as easily see non-establishment and free exercise as two
aspects of the same provision.
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toward religion is a prototypic pronouncement that the
Establishment Clause requires that the government act
neutrally toward religion, with neutrality requiring neither
favoring nor disfavoring religion (either a particular religion
or religion generally).
The phrase “hostility to religion” gained its first
reappearance in a majority opinion just five years later in
Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, where Black wrote:
To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments utilize its public school system to aid any
or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines
and ideals does not, as counsel urge, manifest a governmental
hostility to religion or religious teachings. A manifestation of such
hostility would be at war with our national tradition as embodied
in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise of religion. 17

Like Story and Frankfurter, Black doesn’t tell us what
he means by hostility to religion. Rather he only gives us an
example of what does not count as “manifesting a
governmental hostility to religion” and sensibly points out
that hostility to religion on behalf of the government is
incompatible with the free exercise of religion of that
government’s citizens. Because Black does not explain what
he means by “hostility,” it seems most prudent to assume he
had the everyday usage of the term, as it was used in his day,
in mind.
There are two other points worth making about Black’s
comments. First, like Story, his discussion of hostility to
religion seems to have been prompted by the arguments of
the petitioners. This continued to happen with regularity in
the years that followed. Advocates of expansions of religious
free exercise rights seem to gravitate toward the argument
that the perceived infringements on those rights are
instances of hostility to religion. These claims often fail, as
they did in McCollum, but they often succeed as well, as we

17. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1948).
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will soon see.
Second, Black talks about whether the hostility would be
made “manifest”. Something is manifested when a
reasonable observer can conclude that the thing manifest is
present. Thus, for hostility to be made manifest, in the
ordinary usage of such a phrase, a reasonable observer can
conclude that the conscious enmity or desire to undercut the
object of hostility is present on behalf of the hostile subject.
Some of the conflict we’ve seen in more recent years over
claims of hostility to religion seem best viewed as substantive
differences of opinion concerning which actions reasonably
reveal hostility to religion. This is easy to understand if we
think about the deep emotional and personal feelings many
of us have toward religion (whether those feelings be
positive, negative, or mixed). How different justices and
commentators have made these assessments is something
worth paying attention to as we examine subsequent cases.18
Over the next decade and a half, a couple more
references of hostility toward religion were made in keeping
with the ones that preceded. In the 1952 case Zorach v.
Clauson, Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the
majority, put into more straightforward language a principle
that was latent in the comments that had come before;
writing that “we find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion”
and that “[w]e cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a
philosophy of hostility to religion.”19 The idea here, which can

18. The language of manifesting hostility also appears in Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 85 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“To suggest that a moment-ofsilence statute that includes the word ‘prayer’ unconstitutionally endorses
religion, while one that simply provides for a moment of silence does not,
manifests not neutrality but hostility toward religion.”) and McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 636 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the Tennessee
law which excluded ministers from holding public office “manifests patent
hostility toward, not neutrality respecting, religion; forces or influences a
minister or priest to abandon his ministry as the price of public office; and, in
sum, has a primary effect which inhibits religion.”).
19. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1952).
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be read out of Frankfurter’s and Black’s comments, is that
the Establishment Clause requires detachment from religion
only up until the point that neutrality is achieved, but not so
far that the actions of government begin actively
undercutting or showing enmity toward religion.
In the seminal 1962 case Engel v. Vitale, Black in his
majority opinion again responds to the argument of a party
by rejecting their claim that the action under question
represented government hostility to religion in writing that
“[i]t has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such
a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment
of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility
toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course, could
be more wrong.”20 But of greater significance for the
development of discussion of hostility to religion in the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is Douglas’s
statement in concurrence that “[t]he First Amendment
leaves the Government in a position not of hostility to
religion but of neutrality.”21 This statement is a variant of
Frankfurter’s “no religion shall either receive the state’s
support or incur its hostility.” There Frankfurter articulates
two things that religion should not receive from the state.
Here, Douglas states what religion should receive instead:
neutrality.
These first five cases provide us with many of the seeds
for the cumbersome weedy row that talk of hostility to
religion has grown into in Supreme Court First Amendment
jurisprudence. These cases also laid the groundwork for the
Supreme Court’s first prolonged engagement with the
concept in 1963 in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp. Note that in all the cases we’ve encountered so far
none of the justices have clarified what they mean by
“hostility to religion.” As previously stated, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the justices saw themselves as
20. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433–34 (1962).
21. Id. at 443.
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using the word “hostility” in its ordinary usage in the absence
of stating otherwise. However, as is often the case with words
that are found in pithy Court maxims like “no religion shall
either receive the state’s support or incur its hostility,” “we
cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of
hostility to religion,” and “the First Amendment leaves the
Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of
neutrality,” in subsequent contexts such maxims and their
component parts begin to take on a life of their own, where
their future meaning is shaped by the previous contexts of
use in Court opinions alongside new applications. This
process appears to have started for the word “hostility” as
used in First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of
“hostility to religion” in Schempp. In covering what the
justices had to say about hostility to religion in the case, I
will provide my reasons for this view.
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SCHEMPP TO ALLEGHENY COUNTY (1963 TO 1989)
In Schempp the Court considered two consolidated cases;
both dealing with the constitutionality of required Bible
reading in school.22 An eight-member majority determined
that such a requirement violated the First Amendment. 23
Justice Tom Clark writing for the majority referenced
hostility to religion only in passing in the following:
We agree of course that the State may not establish a “religion of
secularism” in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing
hostility to religion, thus “preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe.” We do not agree, however, that this
decision in any sense has that effect.24

This quick reference seemed to have served only to stake
a position in a discussion that occurred within Schempp’s
concurrences and dissent.
Justice William Brennan wrote a lengthy concurrence in
Schempp where he discussed, among other things, the
“settled” position “that in order to give effect to the First
Amendment’s purpose of requiring on the part of all organs
of government a strict neutrality toward theological
questions, courts should not undertake to decide” questions
related to things like “internal ecclesiastical disputes” and
the “subject of the doctrinal theology.”25 Because Douglas
had contrasted neutrality to religion with hostility to religion
the year before, it makes sense that Brennan might do the
same, and he did in fact do so. In discussing the case of
Ballard v. United States, the 1944 mail fraud case in which
the Court held that the First Amendment barred Courts from
assessing the truth of a religious belief, Brennan wrote the
following:
The case [Ballard] shows how elusive is the line which enforces the

22. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 225 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314).
25. Id. at 243 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Amendment’s injunction of strict neutrality, while manifesting no
official hostility toward religion—a line which must be considered
in the cases now before us. Some might view the result of the
Ballard case as a manifestation of hostility—in that the conviction
stood because the defense could not be raised. To others it might
represent merely strict adherence to the principle of neutrality
already expounded in the cases involving doctrinal disputes.
Inevitably, insistence upon neutrality, vital as it surely is for
untrammeled religious liberty, may appear to border upon religious
hostility.26

Brennan closed his discussion of this topic by stating
that “[f]reedom of religion will be seriously jeopardized if we
admit exceptions for no better reason than the difficulty of
delineating hostility from neutrality in the closest cases.”27
Brennan’s point that the line between neutrality and
lack of neutrality can be elusive has been validated by the
hair-splitting that has occurred at points in Supreme Court
First Amendment religious freedom jurisprudence. But if we
are keeping in mind the ordinary language usage of hostility
as containing “ill will,” “enmity,” or “antagonism,” it does not
seem at all clear that the line between neutrality and
hostility is elusive, for hostility is a far cry from neutrality.
This is not to say there won’t be some circumstances where
hostility is cleverly disguised such that it is hard to tell the
difference between hostility and a “strict adherence to the
principle of neutrality.” Rather it is to say that ordinarily, in
the absence of deception, neutrality and hostility do not
border one another.
How are we to make sense of what Brennan has done
here? I think the answer comes in at least two parts. First,
Brennan is talking about perceptions of hostility and
neutrality as much as he is about actual instances of neutral
behavior and hostile behavior. And as the strong
disagreements that exist within society as to what
constitutes neutrality to religion versus hostility to religion
show, Brennan certainly has a point that the same decision
26. Id. at 245–46.
27. Id. at 246.
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can easily be viewed as being neutral by some audiences and
hostile by others, depending on their perspective. But he is
not merely talking about perceptions of neutrality and
hostility. He also seems to be talking about the concepts of
neutrality and hostility themselves. The other part of the
explanation for what Brennan has said here is that, building
upon the uses of the term “hostility” in earlier opinions,
Brennan has expanded the ordinary definition of hostility in
the context of “hostility to religion” to encompass the entire
range of instances in which the thumb is on the scale against
religion. This expansion takes “hostility” a step away from
its ordinary meaning and into a kind of quasi-technical role
in the context of religious freedom jurisprudence.
Brennan doesn’t appear to have been alone at the time
in making this expansion. Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote in
a separate concurrence, joined by Justice John Marshall
Harlan II, that “untutored devotion to the concept of
neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which
partake not simply of that noninterference and
noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution
commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the
secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the
religious.”28 Goldberg makes an astute observation that
“untutored” devotion to neutrality can lead to
overzealousness and overexpansiveness in enforcement.
However, when it comes to hostility itself, Goldberg’s
discussion of “passive, or even active, hostility” may sound
odd if one has the ordinary meaning of “hostility” in mind.
Hostility in its ordinary guise is active—it’s combative,
antagonistic, warlike. It’s not passive. Yet, Goldberg’s
construction reads as if passive hostility is the default, and
active is the exception. Disdain can perhaps be passive, in
the sense that one shows so little value or respect for the
object of one’s disdain that they give little thought or
consideration to the object. But hostility is more than mere

28. Id. at 306 (J. Goldberg, concurring).
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disdain.
How are we to make sense of Goldberg’s worry that we
may accidentally slip into hostility toward religion? I think
the answer is that Goldberg had the expansive, somewhat
technical definition of “hostility” that Brennan had—i.e.
hostility as encompassing the entire range of situations
where religion is inappropriately stifled, inhibited, or
disfavored. With this expansive definition in mind,
Goldberg’s treatment of passive hostility as the default is a
recognition that most circumstances in which one begins
inhibiting religion because of overeager enforcement of
neutrality toward religion are going to be instances where
one is passive in their desire to inhibit religion itself. The
focus, after all, in such cases is neutrality, not religion. And
the recognition of “even active” hostility is keeping open the
possibility that this overzealous enforcement of neutrality
could, on occasion, go so far as to constitute an active
inhibition of religion, where inhibition of religion becomes
the new object (or can rightfully be perceived as such). But it
is important to keep in mind that this circumstance seems to
be the exception, not the norm.
The lone dissenter, Justice Potter Stewart, also adopted
this expansive understanding of religious hostility, this time
via Black’s opinion in McCollum. Stewart begins by appeal
to the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education case, which did
not appeal to hostility to religion in its analysis.29 Stewart
wrote that “there is an inherent limitation upon the
applicability of the Establishment Clause’s ban on state
support to religion,” which he characterized using Everson’s
language that “[s]tate power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions than it is to favor them.”30 Here, we see
again the recognition that a failure to be neutral can be
29. There was reference to “general hostility to dissentient groups,” but this
does not seem to have carried any substantive weight in the analysis. See Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 36 (1947).
30. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 311 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson, 330
U.S. at 18).
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either positively-valenced in favor of religion or negativelyvalenced to disfavor religion (e.g. to “handicap religions”).
But Stewart does not stop there. He then states that
“this Court recognized that the limitation was one which was
itself compelled by the free exercise guarantee.”31 Stewart
then concludes with Black’s language from McCollum that a
manifestation of hostility to religion would “be at war with
our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.”32 Stewart went out
of his way, not only to connect Establishment Clause
jurisprudence with Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, but
to link the general disfavor of religion expressed as
handicapping in Everson with hostility as used in McCollum.
Over the next twenty years, speaking of “hostility to
religion” as consisting of anything on the negative side of
neutrality toward religion was continually cemented and
reshaped into new pithy and repeatable constructions. It
became commonplace, as Professor Frank Ravitch put it, to
“treat hostility and lack of formal neutrality as two sides of
the same coin.”33 For example, in the 1968 case Epperson v.
Arkansas, Justice Abe Fortas writing for the majority wrote
that government “may not be hostile to any religion or to the
advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote
one religion or religious theory against another or even

31. Id.
32. Id. at 311–12 (citing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 211–12 (1948)).
33. Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: What is
“Hostile” to Religion Under the Establishment Clause? 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1031,
1034 (2004). My claims are somewhat stronger than Ravitch’s, who wrote that
“the Court seems poised to treat” neutrality and lack of hostility as two sides of
the same coin. Id. I agree that the Court is so poised, but it seems to be that the
Court has in fact adopted this position and held to it for quite some time.
However, I am also arguing that this is not the only way in which the Court has
characterized and used the concept of hostility in the context of freedom of
religion. Ravitch rightly noted, with appropriate disapproval, of the separation
between this technical use of “hostility” as non-neutrality and what he calls
treatment that is actually hostile.
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against the militant opposite.”34 He also wrote that the “First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.”35 Here, Fortas nuances what counts as favor of
religion, listing that the government must not “aid, foster, or
promote” religion. But he does not do the same in considering
what counts as disfavoring religion. Rather, he keeps
“hostility” to religion as the blanket expression for the whole
category of disfavor toward religion.36
Note that through all of this, we have yet to see an
instance where a justice explained what they meant by
hostility to religion, other than via contrastive references to
neutrality (and Goldberg’s language implying that hostility
can be passive or active). Rather, what we get is repetition of
principles and applications of those principles to new
situations. Most were attempts to further define either
34. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
35. Id. at 103.
36. In the years since Epperson, courts have continuously appealed to the
language of Epperson and Schempp. See generally Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
708 (1986) (contrasting hostility with neutrality); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 513 (1986) (holding that a prohibition against wearing a yarmulke
while in uniform in United States air force was “based on a neutral, completely
objective standard—visibility” and “was not motivated by hostility against, or any
special respect for, any religious faith”); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,
475 U.S. 534, 554 (1986) (“The Establishment Clause mandates state neutrality,
not hostility, toward religion.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420 (1985)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that barring the program in question show not
neutrality but instead “nothing less than hostility toward religion and the
children who attend church-sponsored schools”); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Sec’y of Lab., 471 U.S. 290, 306 n.32 (1985) (“The District Court found no evidence
that the Department was acting on the basis of hostility to petitioners’ religious
beliefs.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (quoting Epperson, 393
U.S. at 103–04) (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 232–34, 243–53 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)) (discussing hostility towards religion); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973) (contrasting hostility with
neutrality); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 469 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103–04) (calling for government to be
neutral and stating that it “may not be hostile” and “may not aid, foster or
promote” religion); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“We have said that neither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is
the goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment”).
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(1) the boundary between neutrality toward religion against
support, favor, aid, promotion, etc. or (2) neutrality toward
religion against handicapping, disfavoring, being hostile to,
etc. However, during this process there were a few points at
which justices provided additional nuance as to how they
understand hostility toward religion.
For example, in the 1970 case Walz v. Tax Com. Of New
York, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that “hostility
toward religion has taken many shapes and forms—
economic, political, and sometimes harshly oppressive.”37
While this does not define “hostility,” it does identify certain
forms that hostility can take and seems to characterize
“harshly oppressive” hostility as an outlier. This all seems in
keeping with the interpretation of “hostility” as any kind of
disfavor toward religion.
And in Lynch v. Donnelly, a 1984 case where the Court
addressed whether a nativity scene included as part of a city
Christmas display violated the First Amendment, Burger,
again writing for the Court, introduced the new maxim that
the Constitution “affirmatively mandates accommodation,
not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility
toward any.”38 This maxim would appear to expand the set
of things that religious hostility is contrasted with. Rather
than seeing hostility as anything that is non-neutral to
religion in a negative way, Burger’s maxim seems to imply
that anything that falls short of accommodation of religion is
hostility to it.39
This pushes the understanding of hostility as used by the
Court even further from the ordinary meaning of hostility. In
most cases there are many ways in which we can fail to
accommodate something without being hostile to it. In fact,

37. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
38. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
39. The relationship between “neutrality” and “accommodation” is another
topic in Establishment Clause jurisprudence highly worthy of study, but would
be a digression to pursue in depth at this time.
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being neutral to something seems to be a state compatible
with failing to accommodate something. Think, for example,
of a dentist’s office that has a policy which says that anyone
more than ten minutes late to their appointment won’t be
seen. Let’s say I’m in a meeting that runs late. After the
meeting lets out, I call the dentist’s office on my way, letting
them know I’ll likely be more than ten minutes late, and ask
for an accommodation. The dentist’s office denies me one.
Here, they’ve failed to accommodate me, but it seems that
they are merely treating me neutrally so long as they do not
accommodate anyone else and that they are not exhibiting
any disdain or animosity toward me.
Despite Burger’s new maxim, just three years later in
Edwards v. Aguillard, Justice Antonin Scalia reasserted the
view of “hostility” to religion as equivalent to all unfavorable
deviations from neutrality toward religion. In fact Scalia did
so perhaps more explicitly than the Court had yet done,
writing that “we have consistently described the
Establishment Clause as forbidding not only state action
motivated by the desire to advance religion, but also that
intended to ‘disapprove,’ ‘inhibit,’ or evince ‘hostility’ toward
religion” and that “we have said that governmental
‘neutrality’ toward religion is the preeminent goal of the
First Amendment.”40 In doing so, Scalia links “hostility
toward religion” with that which “disapproves” or “inhibits”
religion. Disapproval of or inhibition of an object isn’t
synonymous with being hostile to an object in the ordinary
sense of the word “hostile.” But, after years of implicitly
equating such terms within the context of First Amendment
jurisprudence, Scalia was merely more explicitly identifying
what the semi-technical phrase “hostility toward religion”
had become.
With Burger’s retirement from the bench in 1986, his
push to expand the extent to which the Establishment
Clause required accommodation (and the corollary push for
40. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a wider range of activities to count as hostility to religion)
may have continued to be overshadowed by the older view of
hostility as anything non-neutral to religion. However, this
more expansive view of what counted as hostility to religion
(along with the expansive view of the Establishment Clause
obligations to accommodate religion) found a new champion
with the appointment of Justice Anthony Kennedy.
Kennedy first expressed his views on hostility to religion
in First Amendment jurisprudence in the consolidated case
of Count of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,
where the Court held that a creche that was displayed alone
at the Allegheny County Courthouse violated the First
Amendment but that a Menorah that was part of a larger
holiday display at the City-County Building did not.41
Kennedy stated that the majority’s opinion reflected “an
unjustified hostility toward religion” and “a hostility
inconsistent with our history and our precedents.”42
Citing the majority opinions in Lynch and Walz,
Kennedy argued that “rather than requiring government to
avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion, the
Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in
recognizing and accommodating the central role religion
plays in our society” and that “[a]ny approach less sensitive
to our heritage would border on latent hostility toward
religion, as it would require government in all its
multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the
exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious.”43 This is
reminiscent of Burger’s claim that the Establishment Clause
does not require mere tolerance, but accommodation.
Further, Kennedy’s claim implies that the Establishment
Clause does not bar aid to religion, which runs contrary to
the view first announced in Epperson that government “may
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory
41. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989).
42. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 657.

2020]

UNCLEAR HOSTILITY

663

against another.”44
Later in his dissent, Kennedy circled back to the topic a
second time to add that, “the ability of the organized
community to recognize and accommodate religion in a
society with a pervasive public sector requires diligent
observance of the border between accommodation and
establishment. Our cases disclose two limiting principles:
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits
to religion in such a degree that it in fact establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”45
In summary, Kennedy’s view in Allegheny seems to boil
down to the following two propositions. First, all the
Establishment Clause requires is that the government
neither coerce individuals to participate in religion nor
provide direct benefit to religion such that a state religion is
established (or would “tend” to be established). Second,
anything short of accommodating and aiding religion borders
on “latent hostility to religion.” Thus, Kennedy carried
forward Burger’s expansive view of what constitutes hostility
toward religion which, at least since the 1940s, seems to have
been an outlier view.
Kennedy was the lone dissenter who thought that both
displays were constitutional. (Justices William Brennan,
Thurgood Marshall, and John Paul Stevens thought neither
display was constitutional.) And his deviations from
precedent were explicitly rejected by his colleagues. Justice
Harry Blackmun, who penned the opinion for the Court
wrote the following in response:
Although Justice Kennedy repeatedly accuses the Court of
harboring a ‘”latent hostility” or “callous indifference” toward
religion, nothing could be further from the truth, and the
accusations could be said to be as offensive as they are absurd.

44. Id. at 656 (quoting Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968)).
45. Id. at 659 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
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Justice Kennedy apparently has misperceived a respect for religious
pluralism, a respect commanded by the Constitution, as hostility or
indifference to religion. No misperception could be more antithetical
to the values embodied in the Establishment Clause.46

Not only did Blackmun reject Kennedy’s conclusion
about what constituted hostility to religion, he also fleshed
out the rather uninspiring call for neutrality to religion as
encompassing the more deeply held value of respect for
diverse religions and as an obligation to allow for religious
pluralism in a liberal democracy.
Similarly, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her
concurrence praised the values of religious pluralism and
rejected Kennedy’s characterization of hostility to religion,
writing that,
Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s assertions, neither the
endorsement test nor its application in these cases reflects “an
unjustified hostility toward religion.” Instead, the endorsement
standard recognizes that the religious liberty so precious to the
citizens who make up our diverse country is protected, not impeded,
when government avoids endorsing religion or favoring particular
beliefs over others.47

However, O’Connor also expressed support for a view
that was somewhat more expansive about what constituted
neutrality to religion. A consequence of this would be a larger
category of actions that would constitute hostility to religion
if not permitted. O’Connor expressed this view, writing that,
Judicial review of government action under the Establishment
Clause is a delicate task. The Court has avoided drawing lines
which entirely sweep away all government recognition and
acknowledgment of the role of religion in the lives of our citizens for
to do so would exhibit not neutrality but hostility to religion.
Instead the courts have made case-specific examinations of the
challenged government action and have attempted to do so with the
aid of the standards described by Justice Blackmun . . . .48

46. Id. at 610 (majority opinion).
47. Id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 623.
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Justice John Paul Stevens also rebutted Kennedy’s
position at two different points in his own dissent. At one
point, Stevens quoted Black’s opinion in Engel at length,
including the claim presented earlier that “[n]othing, of
course, could be more wrong” than the view that “to prohibit
state laws respecting an establishment of religious services
in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or
toward prayer.”49
But of greater interest from the perspective of thinking
about how hostility to religion ought to be viewed by the
Court is Stevens’ other rebuttal. Citing Everson, Stevens
wrote that,
The suggestion that the only alternative to governmental support
of religion is governmental hostility to it represents a giant step
backward in our Religion Clause jurisprudence. Indeed in its first
contemporary examination of the Establishment Clause, the Court,
while differing on how to apply the principle, unanimously agreed
that government could not require believers or nonbelievers to
support religions.50

It is not obvious what exactly Stevens considers the
“giant step backward” to be. My best guess is that it is the
removal of the middle-ground space between support and
hostility that had long been characterized as neutrality
toward religion. Stevens very reasonably could have
interpreted Kennedy as arguing that anything less than
support for religion was hostility to religion, and this indeed
would be a substantial deviation from precedent.
But there is a second way to understand this quote from
Stevens—namely, as a recognition that hostility, understood
in its everyday sense, is not a proper descriptor for anything
that fails to comport with what the Establishment Clause
guarantees. There are any number of incidental, accidental,
or otherwise non-malicious ways in which religion can fail to
49. Id. at 653 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 433–35 (1962)).
50. Id. at 652 n.11 (citing Illinois ex rel Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15–16 (1947)).
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be supported or treated neutrally that do not seem to
constitute hostility in the ordinary sense of that word. Even
with the focus on hostility to religion that Kennedy’s novel
views on the matter provided, after nearly fifty years of
hostility to religion playing a role as an important concept in
First Amendment jurisprudence, still no justice had put
forward a view as to what hostility was. But in Allegheny,
Stevens supplied a new articulation of what it might not be.
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CHURCH OF LUKUMI THROUGH 2017
In the years leading up to the sea change brought about
by the Court’s ruling in Employment Division v. Smith,
where the Court held that valid laws of general applicability
that burdened religion didn’t violate the Free Exercise
Clause so long as they passed the rational basis test, the bulk
of the discussion concerning hostility to religion had been
Establishment Clause cases.51 However, the First
Amendment religious freedom landscape after Smith created
space for a new role for the concept of hostility to religion to
play in free exercise cases.
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the
Court was faced with the question of whether a facially
neutral (at least facially neutral according to the Court)
ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice violated the Free
Exercise Clause because of the city’s intent to suppress the
ritual sacrifices of members of the Santeria religion.52
Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court from which no
member dissented and relied heavily on the hostility the
town exhibited toward the Santeria in articulating why the
ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause.
In doing so, Kennedy expanded on the Court’s
jurisprudence concerning hostility to religion in the free
exercise context in two ways. First, he provided the new
maxim that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause protects against
governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”53
This was an important move post-Smith, given that
otherwise Smith would allow for suppression of religion and
might incentivize those with such ambitions to attempt to do
so as long as they were clever enough to think of a way to
make their law appear neutral and generally applicable. The

51. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
52. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–28
(1993).
53. Id. at 534.
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Lukumi maxim gave the Court the necessary means to block
such attempts.
Second, after fifty years of hostility to religion playing a
substantive and recurring role in First Amendment
jurisprudence, in Lukumi, Kennedy provides the first
extensive presentation of evidence of hostility to religion.
Kennedy’s presentation of the hostility exhibited by the city
of Hialeah and its residents is worth quoting at length.
That the ordinances were enacted because of, not merely in spite
of, their suppression of Santeria religious practice, is revealed by
the events preceding their enactment. . . . The minutes and taped
excerpts of the June 9 session, both of which are in the record,
evidence significant hostility exhibited by residents, members of the
city council, and other city officials toward the Santeria religion and
its practice of animal sacrifice. The public crowd that attended the
June 9 meetings interrupted statements by council members
critical of Santeria with cheers . . . . When Councilman Martinez, a
supporter of the ordinances, stated that in prerevolution Cuba
“people were put in jail for practicing this religion,” the audience
applauded.
Other statements by members of the city council were in a similar
vein. For example, Councilman Martinez, after noting his belief
that Santeria was outlawed in Cuba, questioned: “If we could not
practice this [religion] in our home-land [Cuba], why bring it to this
country?” Councilman Cardoso said that Santeria devotees at the
Church “are in violation of everything this country stands for.”
Councilman Mejides indicated that he was “totally against the
sacrificing of animals” and distinguished kosher slaughter because
it had a “real purpose.” The “Bible says we are allowed to sacrifice
an animal for consumption,” he continued, “but for any other
purposes, I don’t believe that the Bible allows that.” The president
of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked: “What can we do
to prevent the Church from opening?”
Various Hialeah city officials made comparable comments. The
chaplain of the Hialeah Police Department told the city council that
Santeria was a sin, “foolishness,” “an abomination to the Lord,” and
the worship of “demons.” He advised the city council: “We need to
be helping people and sharing with them the truth that is found in
Jesus Christ.” He concluded: “I would exhort you . . . not to permit
this Church to exist.” The city attorney commented that Resolution
87-66 indicated: “This community will not tolerate religious
practices which are abhorrent to its citizens . . . .” Similar comments
were made by the deputy city attorney. . . .
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In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The
ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. The
pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents
and their religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms
target this religious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were
gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals
but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances
suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to
achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense. These
ordinances are not neutral, and the court below committed clear
error in failing to reach this conclusion.54

Kennedy’s choice of evidence, as well as his description
of it, is important in several respects.
In most previous instances, the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence concerning the religion
provisions and hostility had centered around the
consequences and effects of the law. However, in Lukumi the
evidence Kennedy provided of hostility to religion was by and
large about the motivations, attitudes, and expressions of the
officials and citizens of Hialeah. Far less attention is given to
the consequences of the law (and even when consequences
were focused on, this seemed to be for the purpose of
providing confirmatory evidence about intentions). This
focus on motivations and intentions was used to generate
Kennedy’s conclusions that the object of the ordinances was
suppression of religion, that the ordinances targeted
religious belief, and that they disclosed animosity toward the
Santeria. Yet, despite these differences between the analysis
in Lukumi and previous analyses of hostility to religion,
Kennedy retains the pairing of hostility with neutrality in
concluding that “the ordinances are not neutral.” What are
we to make of all this?
Several things are worth noting. First, Lukumi
represents one of the clearest instances where hostility to
religion is present in the everyday usage of the word
hostility. Kennedy’s identification of the evidence showing
animosity is very fitting here. But, such talk of animosity
54. Id. at 542.
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strikes me as something that would have been out of place
had it been used in a number of the other cases that dealt
with “hostility toward religion.” In this case, it doesn’t make
sense to treat “hostility” as on a par with all that which
“disapproves” or “inhibits” religion as Scalia implied in
Aguillard or with all that “handicaps” religion as Stewart
suggested in Schempp. No, what Kennedy identifies seems
to be something a good deal stronger.
One way of viewing the matter is to conclude that, while
the thing Kennedy identified in Lukumi is something
stronger than what is identified as “hostility” in these other
cases, this is only because the hostility in Lukumi happened
to be particularly egregious and as a result was characterized
using different terms. On this view, at the end of the day, all
Kennedy’s uses of “hostility” remain synonymous, even if
they are described in different ways based on the context of
identification. The consequence of this view is that a very
large number of instances where the government fails to
accord as much support for religion as Kennedy sees fit are
instances of the government behaving with animosity toward
religion. This strikes me as a warped conclusion, so perhaps
it is better to conclude instead that Kennedy has two
different senses of hostility in mind: the one which is used as
a contrastive term to neutrality or accommodation, and the
other which is used for instances of a motivation to suppress
religion or an animosity toward religion. I think the evidence
as to Kennedy’s view in Lukumi is underdetermined.
However, the conceptual point is much clearer. Not all
instances that fail to be neutral toward religion (and
certainly not all instances that fail to accommodate or aid
religion) are instances of animus toward religion. If that
conflation is the view we impute to the Court, we are
imputing to them a rather obvious falsity, and I think it is
best to avoid doing so unless the evidence is compelling. For
this reason, I think the best conclusion is that post-Lukumi,
the Court has two distinct uses of the term hostility that it
employs. The first use is a semi-technical term of art used to
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pick out all instances in which religion is not treated
neutrally (or not supported or accommodated, on the more
expansive Burger-Kennedy view). This sense of “hostile to
religion” serves the same role as phrases like “disfavors
religion” and “inhibits religion.” The second sense of
“hostility” is the everyday sense of the term which is roughly
synonymous with “animosity.”
There also seems to be a divide in usage depending on
the ideology of the justice. The technical definition of
hostility as non-neutral in a manner that disfavors religion
is more often used by moderate and liberal justices, while—
including Justice Kennedy as conservative on the topic of
religious liberty—the more conservative justices have moved
in the direction of a return to the ordinary language usage of
“hostility” in the context of religion. One explanation is that
conservatives may be more apt to perceive animus on the
part of those whose actions inhibit or disfavor religion (along
with being more apt to see actions as inhibiting or
disfavoring religion to begin with) than liberals.
As we look at the appeals to religious hostility that the
Court has made since Lukumi, I will seek to show how the
above characterization maps onto those cases. There have
been some instances where the Court has continued to
appeal to “hostility to religion” as the contrast class to
neutrality to religion in any way that disfavors religion.55
But there has also been an increase in referring to hostility
in a manner that would seem to equate it with animus. In
some cases, this has been explicit. For example, in City of

55. See, e.g., Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 527 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We should take this opportunity to scrap the
‘pervasively sectarian’ test and reaffirm that the Constitution requires, at a
minimum, neutrality not hostility toward religion.”). It seems noteworthy that in
the latter case Justice Clarence Thomas saw the “neutrality not hostility”
standard as a minimum; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 846 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“The message
is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious
groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but
hostility toward religion.”).
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Boerne v. Flores, Kennedy, writing for the Court in the 1997
case, stated that “[i]t is difficult to maintain that such laws
are based on animus or hostility to the burdened religious
practices or that they indicate some widespread pattern of
religious discrimination in this country.”56 It is not obvious
what Kennedy takes the relationship between “animosity”
and “hostility” to be in his locution “animosity or hostility,”
but it seems to me that the best reading is that putting the
two terms in conjunction helps elucidate the meaning of each
by their similarity to one another and inclusion together. But
the connection between hostility as being something
containing enmity or animus has also more recently been
expressed in subtler ways. For example, in 2000, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, writing in dissent in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe wrote of the majority
opinion that it “bristles with hostility to all things religious
in public life.”57 It is hard to see how that which means
merely “disfavor” or “inhibition” can bristle, but that idea of
bristling with animosity seems vivid and natural.

56. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
57. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
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MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP
Language is slippery and there are worse things that
could happen to a Court than that it use a phrase in two
diverging ways, particularly when the phrase in question
isn’t typically dispositive. Prior to 2018, the only clear case
in which a determination of hostility to religion played the
dispositive role was Lukumi. However, in 2018 the role of
“hostility
toward
religion” in
First
Amendment
jurisprudence was elevated yet again via its dispositive role
in the outcome of Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission and the important role that it
played in the primary dissent, in Trump v. Hawaii. These
cases are important for several reasons. First, both cases
seem to continue the shift back toward using “hostility” in its
ordinary sense while still linking hostility as a counterpart
to neutrality. Second, both cases apply the legal concept of
hostility to religion to new kinds of cases and in new ways.
As a result, these cases highlight that it is high time that the
Court confront more directly the meaning of “hostility to
religion” and what exactly that phrase’s role in First
Amendment jurisprudence ought to be.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was presented with
the question of whether a Colorado Court of Appeals ruling
violated the First Amendment in its holding that a baker had
violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) by
refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple due
to religious objections to same-sex marriage.58 A Colorado
Administrative Law Judge concluded that Phillips had
violated CADA, which bars, among other things,
discrimination based on sexual orientation in a place of
public accommodation.59 This ruling was upheld by both the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the Colorado Court of

58. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1726 (2018).
59. Id.
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Appeals.60 The baker, Jack Phillips, who is a devout
Christian, argued that the ruling violated his constitutional
rights to free exercise of religion and free speech.61
However, the Supreme Court did not address the
questions about the free exercise and free speech rights of
the baker in connection with his refusal, instead holding that
the Colorado order “must be invalidated” because the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission expressed “hostility”
toward Phillips’ religious beliefs that “was inconsistent with
the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied
in a manner that is neutral toward religion.”62 This ruling is
significant in terms of the role and understanding that
“hostility toward religion” played in several respects.
First, like Lukumi, this is an outlier case when compared
to previous cases both because the analysis of hostility
toward religion played was dispositive and, to a lesser extent,
because it was a free exercise case rather than an
Establishment Clause case. However, Masterpiece was
unlike Lukumi in that Lukumi followed the bulk of previous
cases in using the analysis of hostility to religion to assess
whether or not a rule was constitutional.63 Masterpiece
departed from this by applying an analysis of hostility to
religion to an assessment of adjudication. This fact seems to
have been important to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who
wrote in her dissent that “[t]he different outcomes the Court
features do not evidence hostility to religion of the kind we
have previously held to signal a free-exercise violation.”64 For
Ginsburg, as we will see shortly, the way in which the
hostility to religion analysis was extended in Masterpiece
was troubling, but for Kennedy the appeal to hostility to

60. Id. at. 1726–27.
61. Id. at 1724.
62. Id. at 1732.
63. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 527–28 (1993).
64. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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religion in Masterpiece was a natural extension of what had
come before.
As in Lukumi, Kennedy wrote the majority opinion.
Kennedy explained the motivation that assessing whether
the adjudicatory bodies exhibited hostility toward religion
played in Masterpiece, writing that “the delicate question of
when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an
otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be
determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on
the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance
the State sought to reach.”65 Seven of the nine justices
concluded that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
exhibited hostility toward Phillips’ religious beliefs in the
sense that the Commission failed to behave neutrally toward
Phillips’ religious beliefs.66
In explaining the nature of the hostility, Kennedy offered
two kinds of evidence. First, he appealed to specific claims
made by two members of the seven-member Colorado Civil
Rights Commission. Kennedy identified that one
commissioner said that Phillips could believe “what he wants
to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he
decides to do business in the state” and that the same
commissioner later stated that “if a businessman wants to do
business in the state and he’s got an issue with the—the
law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look
at being able to compromise.”67 He then provided a more
extensive quote from a second commissioner who stated the
following:
“I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the
last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to
justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be
slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—
we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has
been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most
65. Id. at 1724 (majority opinion).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1729.
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despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their
religion to hurt others.”68

The second kind of evidence Kennedy offered was the fact
that shortly after the Commission found Phillips liable, it
concluded three other bakers hadn’t violated CADA when
they refused to make cakes which contained words and
symbols that expressed religious opposition to same-sex
marriage.69 Kennedy concluded that “the difference in
treatment between Phillips’ case and the cases of other
bakers who objected to a requested cake on the basis of
conscience and prevailed before the Commission” was
“[a]nother indication of hostility.”70
Kennedy raised a third issue based on the writings of the
Colorado Court of Appeals, who reviewed de novo the
decision of the Commission. Kennedy objected to the Court
of Appeals’ claim that Phillips’ cake could be distinguished
from the other three cases because “the Division found that
the bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of
the offensive nature of the requested message.”71 Kennedy
interpreted the word “offensive” here as being used in a
subjective sense to refer to the adjudicators’ own
determination of what was offensive. (We’ll return to this
questionable reading of the claim later.) For now, what’s
relevant is that Kennedy saw this as negative treatment
toward religion as well, yet framed this recognition not in
terms of hostility to religion, but rather as sending “a signal
of official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”72 But
given the history of “disapproval” of religion also being a way
of speaking about negative deviations from neutrality toward
religion, if we understand hostility to religion in the semitechnical sense as a negative deviation from neutrality in
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1729–30.
71. Id. at 1731.
72. Id.
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treatment of religion, this amounts to the same thing.
This leads us to the question of how we ought to best
interpret what the Court meant in holding that the
Commission exhibited hostility toward Phillips’ religious
beliefs. There is ample evidence that the Court is using
“hostility to religion” as synonymous with “lack of neutrality
toward religion.” But there is also ample evidence to suggest
that the Court is treating “hostility to religion” as
synonymous with “animosity to religion.” On my account, for
the Court to be using hostility toward religion in both these
ways is for the Court either to be equivocating or to be
appealing to an incoherent concept. I’ll first provide my
reasons for concluding that the Court used “hostility toward
religion” in both these senses (leaving aside the question of
whether this leaves the Court in a position of equivocating or
appealing to an incoherent concept). I’ll then turn to other
relevant aspects of the Court’s use of hostility to religion in
the Masterpiece case.
Perhaps the most significant indicator that the Court
treated hostility toward religion as both synonymous with a
lack of neutrality to religion and synonymous with animosity
is the Court’s expression of the holding of the case in both
terms. For example, Kennedy writes that,
For the reasons just described, the Commission’s treatment of
Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment
not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious
viewpoint. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, supra, the Court made
clear that the government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s
guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are
hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in
a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the
illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. The Free Exercise
Clause bars even “subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of
religion. Id., at 534. Here, that means the Commission was obliged
under the Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral
toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs. 73

The above passage equates hostility not only with
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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negative deviations from neutrality, but even subtle such
deviations. However, as Kennedy continues his explanation,
again citing to Lukumi, he explicates hostility in terms of
animosity writing that,
The Constitution “commits government itself to religious tolerance,
and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention
stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all
officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the
Constitution and to the rights it secures.”74

The concept of “hostility” is pulled in different directions
in the concurrences as well. For example, Justice Elena
Kagan, in her concurrence connects “hostility” with “bias,”
while Justice Neil Gorsuch in his concurrence connects
hostility with “judgmental dismissal.”75 To me, the former
reads more in the vein of “hostility” as “non-neutrality” while
the latter reads more in line with “hostility” as “animosity.”
While for a majority of the justices in Masterpiece, as in
Lukumi, the distinction between non-neutrality and
animosity didn’t seem necessary to consider for the purposes
of determining an outcome, it is not hard to envision a
situation in which the distinction between these two
meanings of hostility would itself be dispositive.
While much of the discussion in the last several pages
has focused on an ambiguity in the Court’s uses of the phrase
“hostility to religion,” Masterpiece raises a number of
additional matters of importance concerning the Court’s
implementation of the phrase and the (perhaps incoherent)
concept they mean to pick out with it. In what follows, I flag
three additional points of difference between the way the
Court appealed to hostility to religion in Masterpiece versus
in previous cases. The first two points of difference are
structural ones about the role that the identified hostility to
religion played in generating the outcome. The third point

74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 1733–34 (Kagan, J., concurring); Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
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deals with a change in what counted as sufficient evidence of
hostility toward religion in Masterpiece. Based on the
discussion that follows, I conclude that 1) the Court needs to
get clearer on what hostility toward religion means and
2) the Court ought to be shrinking rather than expanding the
role that appeals to the phrase “hostility to religion” play in
its jurisprudence.
The first structural difference in Masterpiece is that,
unlike previous cases, it is not clear that hostility to religion
was a “but for cause” in the issue at hand, so to speak. By
this I mean the following. In Establishment Clause cases in
which laws are assessed to determine if they hostile to
religion, generally the issue in those cases is whether the law
would be in place but for hostility (typically cast as nonneutrality) to religion. Similarly, in Lukumi one way to
frame what the Court asked was whether the Hialeah
ordinance against the slaughter of animals would have been
in place but for hostility against the Santeria. However, in
Masterpiece, the Court does not appear to have been
concerned with whether Colorado would have ruled as they
did but for the supposed hostility.
This is evidenced in Masterpiece by the fact that at no
point did the Court question the neutrality of the
Administrative Law Judge who first determined that
Phillips had violated CADA. And even when it came to the
Commission, Kennedy’s opinion never suggested, contra
Lukumi, that were it not for the hostility toward religion
exhibited on by the Commission, that the ruling would have
been reversed. Rather, the Court’s view seems to be the
weaker position that the perceived lack of neutrality
undermines confidence that Phillips was treated fairly. One
of Ginsburg’s primary points in her dissent seems to be that
potential lack of neutrality wasn’t enough to warrant
invalidating the Colorado Court of Appeals decision,
especially when there were other levels of independent
decision-making. Ginsburg lays out this objection as follows.
I see no reason why the comments of one or two Commissioners
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should be taken to overcome Phillips’ refusal to sell a wedding cake
to Craig and Mullins. The proceedings involved several layers of
independent decisionmaking, of which the Commission was but one.
First, the Division had to find probable cause that Phillips violated
CADA. Second, the ALJ entertained the parties’ cross motions for
summary judgment. Third, the Commission heard Phillips’ appeal.
Fourth, after the Commission’s ruling, the Colorado Court of
Appeals considered the case de novo. What prejudice infected the
determinations of the adjudicators in the case before and after the
Commission? The Court does not say. Phillips’ case is thus far
removed from the only precedent upon which the Court relies,
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993),
where the government action that violated a principle of religious
neutrality implicated a sole decisionmaking body, the city council.76

This expansion of what type of procedure is assessed for
hostility toward religion is a second structural way in which
Masterpiece represents an expansive change in the role that
appeals to hostility to religion in Supreme Court freedom of
religion jurisprudence. In one respect, this expansion doesn’t
strike me as problematic. Preserving neutrality along with
an appearance of neutrality toward religion in adjudications
is important, and it makes sense for the Court to examine
such things in seeking to uphold the First Amendment.
But someone might reasonably find troubling the way in
which the Court downplayed the extent to which Masterpiece
represented
new
territory
in
First
Amendment
jurisprudence. The framework created in Lukumi was used
to assess the constitutionality of ordinances and the process
by which they were passed. In Masterpiece, the Court
extended the Lukumi framework to look at the
constitutionality of a multi-level adjudicatory process, but
never identified this as an extension of the doctrine. In so
doing the Court breezed over the salient ways in which the
two processes under examination differed. As Rutgers Law
Professor Bernard Bell points out, “Jack Phillips’ lawyer
herself did not object to any of the three ‘offending’
statements during the proceeding and never sought any
Commissioner’s recusal. That failure to exhaust
76. Id. at 1751–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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administrative remedies would ordinarily preclude
challenging the Commission’s ruling on the grounds of
Commissioner bias.”77 Bell also notes that “Masterpiece
Cakeshop asserted a claim of bias for the first time in its
briefs to the Colorado Court of Appeals” and even at that
point identified only one of the comments considered in the
Supreme Court’s opinion.78 Bell points out that if a recusal
motion had been made the Commissioners “would have had
an opportunity to explain their determination on recusal or
provide context for their statements.”79
Regardless of whether the Court should have denied
certiorari given the earlier steps Phillips’ lawyers failed to
take and the other administrative remedies that hadn’t been
pursued, the point is that the Court’s ruling in Masterpiece
fails to put forward any kind of developed view on when and
how the possibility of hostility to neutrality within a multilevel judicial proceeding ought to impact the rulings
generated. The default rule as of now seems to be, find
hostility at any level and regardless of what steps may or
may not have been taken to address the hostility at earlier
levels, once the hostility is identified, and the ruling ought to
be invalidated. This seems to put too few expectations on
parties to raise claims of potential bias or hostility in
adjudicatory proceedings as they arise. And given the
difficulty of predicting what an appeals court may consider
an instance of hostility or bias, this puts trial, and mid-level
courts of review in a difficult position.
Thus, structurally, Masterpiece expanded the role that

77. Bernard Bell, A Lemon Cake: Ascribing Religious Motivation in
Administrative Adjudications—A Comment on Masterpiece Cakeshop (Part II).
YALE J. ON REG. (June 20, 2018), http://www.yalejreg.com/nc/a-lemon-cakeascribing-religious-motivation-in-administrative-adjudications-a-comment-onmasterpiece-cakeshop-part-ii/.s
78. Id. (citing Appellants’ Opening Brief at 26, Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (2015), accessible at, 2015 WL 13622550; Appellants’
Reply Brief at 14–15, accessible at, 2015 WL 13622552).
79. Id.
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appeals to hostility to religion play in free exercise
jurisprudence 1) by treating a finding of hostility to religion
as dispositive even without an argument that the hostility
played a but for cause in the outcome, and 2) by applying the
test of hostility toward religion to a multi-level adjudication.
But Masterpiece is also significant because, like Lukumi, it
provides us with another instance where the Court
concentrates on what counts as evidence of hostility toward
religion. However, in Lukumi the only reasonable
interpretation of the evidence was that Hialeah had
exhibited hostility toward the Santeria religion. By contrast,
in Masterpiece the evidence Kennedy cites of hostility toward
the baker’s religious beliefs is open to multiple
interpretations. And only by adopting an uncharitable
reading of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission can we
make sense of the claim that the Commission displayed
“elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the
sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.” This
highlights the slipperiness of the hostility toward religion
test and provides additional reason to rethink its place in the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
In order to see how what was presented as evidence of
the Commission’s hostility toward the baker’s religious belief
is open to multiple reasonable interpretations, we need to
look more closely at the evidence Kennedy offered of hostility
to religion. Kennedy offered the statements of two members
of the seven-member Commission and information about
three other rulings made by the Commission as his evidence.
Let’s look at each in turn.
First, Kennedy provides two claims made by
Commissioner Raju Jairam.80 Kennedy writes that Jairam
“suggested that Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to
80. Portions of this section were previously included in Mark Satta,
Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Hostile Interpretation of the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV.: Amicus (Apr. 12, 2019)
https://harvardcrcl.org/masterpiece-cakeshop-a-hostile-interpretation-of-thecolorado-civil-rights-commission/.
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believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides
to do business in the state.’”81 Kennedy also cites Jairam’s
claim that “if a businessman wants to do business in the
state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his
personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to
compromise.”82
Kennedy
acknowledges
that
these
statements are ambiguous, writing that,
Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different
interpretations. On the one hand, they might mean simply that a
business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual
orientation, regardless of the proprietor’s personal views. On the
other hand, they might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive
comments showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free
exercise rights and the dilemma he faced. In view of the comments
that followed, the latter seems the more likely. 83

It’s unclear whether “the comments that followed” that
Kennedy refers to are the comments that follow in Kennedy’s
majority opinion or the comments that followed in the
original Commission hearing that Kennedy is quoting from.
Because Kennedy is unclear on this point, let’s consider both
interpretations.
In looking at the context surrounding Jairam’s
statements in the record for the Commission’s hearing, it’s
hard to see how the context of the Commission hearing could
lend credence to Kennedy’s interpretation that Jairam’s
remarks were “inappropriate and dismissive comments
showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise
rights and the dilemma he faced.” At the hearing leading up
to the first comment Kennedy cites from Jairam, another one
of the Commissioners, Diann Rice, was offering her
reasoning for thinking that the law under which charges
against the baker were brought was a constitutional law. The
transcript from the hearing quotes Rice as saying the
following:
81. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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I think that the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act is written in a very
neutral manner. Some exceptions have been made for religious
organizations or businesses or organizations that clearly serve a
single sex. As noted a women’s clinic or some organization like that.
But those are very clear—clearly delineated exceptions. If
Masterpiece Cakeshop were—or Mr. Phillips were an ordained
minister and he was only serving commissioners or congregates of
his church that might be a different situation. But he is—does have
a public business and is serving the public. So I—you know, I don’t
think that this case falls within the exceptions . . . I think there is a
very significant and important reason for the Antidiscrimination
Act and a significant—it is a significant benefit to the state to have
this statute and to enforce it.84

After Rice concluded, the Commission Chair, Katina
Banks, acknowledged Rice’s comments, agreed with them,
and asked “does anyone else have anything they want to
add?” It is at this point that Jairam spoke. The meeting
transcript records a back and forth between Jairam and
Banks as follows.
Commissioner Jairam: I don’t think the act necessarily prevents
Mr. Phillips from believing what he wants to believe. And—but if
he decided to do business in the state, he’s got to follow (inaudible).
And I don’t think the Act is overreaching to the extent that it
prevents him from exercising his free speech.
Chairwoman: Well, free speech we already—we talked about. But
what do you think about his—
Commissioner Jairam: His belief system, yes.
Chairwoman: Right, right, his religious beliefs.
Commissioner Jairam: We all have our own belief systems.
Chairwoman: Yes.
Commissioner Jairam: And, you know, as a businessman, I
shouldn’t allow my belief system to impact how I treat people,
bottom line.
Chairwoman: Okay. That is the bottom line, Commissioner Jairam,
thank you . . . To make sure I’m understanding, we’re saying that
we think the statute—there are good reasons for the statute; that it
84. Transcript of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Meeting, Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 22–23 (May 30, 2014).
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is valid; and that it’s neutral in general in its application simply—
just as the administrative law judge determined.85

Several things are illuminated by this additional
context. First, the Commission clearly has as one of its values
that Colorado law be neutral toward religion (as evidenced
by the comments of Rice and Banks). Second, the
Commission offered a cogent rationale for concluding that
the law in question was neutral toward religion. Third,
Jairam seemed to be making an important and long-held
distinction
in
United
States
First
Amendment
jurisprudence—namely, that the right to religious belief is
absolute, but that the right to religious action is not.86
Jairam’s point seems to be one about the ability of the state
to impose reasonable and neutral restrictions on actions,
even while the right to belief remains absolute. Fourth, the
conversation is one that is blending together questions about
free speech with questions about free exercise of religion. In
this light, it takes a very uncharitable reading of Jairam to
attribute to him the views that Kennedy does.
Adding context to Jairam’s second quote even more
strongly undercuts the interpretation Kennedy gives to
Jairam’s statements. In the second quote, Jairam was
responding to “an argument by the respondent” that “he
didn’t offer to sell them a wedding cake, but he offered to sell
them different products.”87 In expressing why he didn’t find
that argument compelling, Jairam is recorded as stating the
following.
And I believe the—it was best said by the judges in the New Mexico
case, where the laws are here just to protect individuals from
humiliation and dignitary harm. And that they should be very clear,
that is, we do not want people to feel undignified when they walk
into any place of business and do business that, you know, serves

85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878).
87. Transcript of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Meeting, Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 22–23 (May 30, 2014).

686

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the public.
And I will also, you know, refer—you know, I’m referring to the
comments made by Justice (inaudible) in that case. And essentially
he was saying that if a businessman wants to do business in the
state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his
personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.
And I think it was very well said by that judge.88

The added context presents the reader with the
significant detail Kennedy omits that Jairam was offering a
paraphrase of a New Mexico judge, not his own view. Once
again it seems to me most plausible that Jairam’s underlying
point is about the difference between the absolute right to
believe and the more limited right to action, especially when
acting as a proprietor in the public sphere. So when it comes
to the comments of Commissioner Jairam, not only does the
conclusion that Jairam made “inappropriate and dismissive
comments showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free
exercise rights” seem uncharitable; it is implausible fullstop.
But as stated earlier, Kennedy writes ambiguously about
whether it is the context of the Commission hearing or the
subsequent portion of his opinion that is supposed to make it
clearer that Jairam’s comments exhibited hostility to
religion. Having discussed Jairam’s statements, I turn to the
subsequent portion of Kennedy’s opinion. After offering
Jairam’s comments as evidence of hostility toward the
baker’s religious beliefs, Kennedy cites a statement from a
second commissioner at a later hearing. The transcript
containing this comment attributes the statement to a
“female speaker” who, based on the context of the
conversation, appears to be another commissioner. The
speaker is recorded as saying the following.
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last
meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify
all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be
slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—

88. Id.
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we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has
been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their
religion to hurt others.89

In discussing this quote Kennedy writes that,
To describe a man’s faith as “one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use” is to disparage his religion in at least
two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by
characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something insubstantial
and even insincere. The commissioner even went so far as to
compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to
defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. This sentiment is
inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s
antidiscrimination law—a law that protects against discrimination
on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation. 90

At first blush, this Commissioner’s comments seem more
plausible than Jairam’s comments as showing hostility
toward the baker’s religious belief. But context once again
complicates things, as does a careful look at what the
Commissioner actually said.
First, the context in which this quote is presented
provides much less of a guide as to what the Commissioner
might have meant. The statement was offered very near the
closing of the meeting when the Chair was asking each
member if they had any closing comments they wanted to
offer before a final motion. The quoted Commissioner was the
last to offer a comment at a point in which the conversation
seemed already to have mostly wrapped up and in which it’s
not clear how her comment connected to the comments that
preceded hers. Kennedy takes as evidence of hostility toward
the baker’s religion the fact that “[t]he record shows no
objection to these comments from other commissioners.”91

89. Id.
90. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1729 (2018).
91. Transcript of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Meeting, Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 22–23 (May 30, 2014).
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But it’s not clear what service responding to the comment
would have served given that it doesn’t appear to have been
material to the rest of the discussion at the hearing or to the
outcome of any motions. Rather, it seemed merely to have
been offered at a time in which the Chair was allowing each
member to say their final words.
Second, while it may be reasonable of Kennedy to
assume that the Commissioner’s comment was about the
baker’s belief, the Commissioner never actually references
the baker in her comments at all. Rather, all the
Commissioner states are some historical claims followed by
an opinion that it’s despicable rhetoric to use religion to hurt
people. But, given the comment’s acontextual nature, the
Commissioner could just as easily be commenting about the
possibility that the baker was feigning sincerely held belief
in order to legally justify his discrimination. The
Commissioner’s comment is mysterious. It’s an expression of
sentiment, but it’s not clear how the sentiment was meant to
map onto the case at hand or onto the baker’s beliefs.
The takeaway from Jairam’s comments and the second
Commissioner’s comments are different and it is worth
noting those differences. In the case of Jairam, only on an
uncharitable reading can he be viewed as having displayed
hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs. In the case of
the second Commissioner, that she exhibited hostility toward
Phillips’ religion seems like a viable possibility, but if we look
at what she actually said and at the context in which she said
it, it is not obvious that this is so. At the very least it is not
obvious in the way that a city attorney stating that “This
community will not tolerate religious practices which are
abhorrent to its citizens . . .” indicates hostility toward the
Santeria religion when offered in the context of whether or
not to pass a law banning the ritual slaughter of animals
right after the Santeria obtained the proper licensing for a
church in the city of Hialeah.
The third piece of evidence that Kennedy offered was the
fact that the Commission had ruled that three other bakers

2020]

UNCLEAR HOSTILITY

689

hadn’t violated Colorado law, which protects customers on
the grounds of religious creed as well as sexual orientation,
when those bakers turned down requests to make cakes
containing messages expressing religious opposition to samesex marriage. Kennedy writes that “[t]he treatment of the
other cases and Phillips’ case could reasonably be interpreted
as being inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is
involved, quite apart from whether the cases should
ultimately be distinguished.”92 I agree that this is one
(among several) reasonable interpretations. But a
“reasonable interpretation” standard seems to me entirely
the wrong standard to adopt. Implicit in the claim that a
“reasonable interpretation” of this fact was that there was
inconsistency is that there are other reasonable
interpretations in which there was not inconsistency. And it
seems to me there are such reasonable interpretations, and
that these other reasonable interpretations are far more
plausible interpretations.
For example, the cakes in the other three cases all
involved specific text and symbols on the cakes that the
bakers refused to apply. Thus, another reasonable
interpretation is that the Commission treated the other
three cases differently because they all involved explicit
messaging, while the cake in Masterpiece arguably did not.
The Supreme Court could choose ultimately to disagree that
such a difference should matter, but that doesn’t change the
fact that the Commission could have used that difference
between the cases in good faith as a principled reason to
reach different conclusions among the cases. Furthermore, if
one is being charitable to the Colorado Court of Appeals, it
seems more likely to me that when the Court of Appeals
wrote that Phillips’ case could be distinguished from the
other three cases because “the Division found that the
bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of the
offensive nature of the requested message,” their point

92. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.
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wasn’t that messages opposing same-sex marriage were
offensive to them and that messages in support of same-sex
marriage were not offensive to them. Rather, what they
meant to highlight was that by asking for cakes with specific
text and symbols, the customer in the other three cases was
asking for them to make a much more explicit message that
the bakers found offensive. The key to the distinction was the
nature of the message the cakes contained, not who found
the message offensive. So it would seem that at best all
Kennedy offered was that bias on the part of the Commission
against Phillip’s religious beliefs was but one of several
reasonable interpretations of the evidence presented.93
If the Court is going to invalidate a ruling on grounds of
hostility to religion, it seems that the Court’s standard ought
to be much higher than merely that a reasonable
interpretation of a lower adjudicative body’s actions is that
the actions indicate hostility toward religion. The Court’s
framework seems to me to be a troublesome deviation from
the standard in Lukumi where Kennedy wrote that “the
neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances
had as their object the suppression of religion.”94

93. See Mark Satta, Why You Can’t Sell Your Cake and Control it Too:
Distinguishing Use from Design in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado, HARV. CIV.
RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV: AMICUS (July 10, 2019) https://harvardcrcl.org/whyyou-cant-sell-your-cake-and-control-it-too-distinguishing-use-from-design-inmasterpiece-cakeshop-v-colorado/ (arguing at greater length that there are
principled and legally relevant distinctions between Phillips’ case and the cases
of the three other bakers).
94. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542
(1993) (emphasis added).
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TRUMP V. HAWAII
Masterpiece wasn’t the only high-profile case in 2018 to
engage with the Court’s jurisprudence around hostility to
religion. Weeks after the decision in Masterpiece, in Trump
v. Hawaii the Court ruled 5-4 that President Donald Trump’s
ban on entry into the United States of foreign nationals from
seven countries, most of which were countries with Muslim
majority populations, was a permissible exercise of
presidential power. Chief Justice John Roberts, who wrote
the opinion for the Court, referenced hostility to religion in
two places, both of which seem to be responses to the dissents
offered by Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Sonia
Sotomayor. In his first reference, Roberts writes the
following.
It cannot be said that it is impossible to “discern [from Trump’s
travel ban] a relationship to legitimate state interests” or that the
[Trump’s] policy is “inexplicable by anything but animus.” Indeed,
the dissent can only attempt to argue otherwise by refusing to apply
anything resembling rational basis review. But because there is
persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate
grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any
religious hostility, we must accept that independent justification.95

Shortly thereafter, Roberts also writes that,
The Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes:
preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and
inducing other nations to improve their practices. The text says
nothing about religion. Plaintiffs and the dissent nonetheless
emphasize that five of the seven nations currently included in the
Proclamation have Muslim-majority populations. Yet that fact
alone does not support an inference of religious hostility, given that
the policy covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim population and is
limited to countries that were previously designated by Congress or
prior administrations as posing national security risks. 96

Roberts appears to be aiming to accomplish two different
things here. In the first quote, Roberts offers a reason for why

95. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018).
96. Id.
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an examination of the question of hostility to religion is the
wrong test to apply in this case. In the second quote, Roberts
presents an argument for why hostility to religion cannot be
inferred in the case of the proclamation in question.
There are a number of important points worth
highlighting here. First, note that in the first of the two
quotes provided from Roberts, the Chief Justice appears to
be using the terms “animus” and “hostility” interchangeably.
We will see that Sotomayor does the same in her dissent.
Thus, the current Court seems very comfortable treating
“hostility to religion” as synonymous with “animus to
religion.”
Second, Roberts’ argument that an examination of
potential hostility toward the Muslim religion on the part of
Trump is unnecessary strikes me as jurisprudentially
mysterious. Roberts’ view seems to be that because rational
basis is the proper test for determining if there is
presidential authority to make the proclamation that
somehow this entails that the question of whether or not
there was hostility to religion becomes moot. This is
mysterious because, as we have seen throughout this paper,
traditionally assessments of whether or not there is hostility
to religion—whether that is understood as a lack of
neutrality, as animus, or as both—are ways of testing
whether or not a constitutional violation of the First
Amendment right to religious freedom has occurred. In
Hawaii, the Court determined that three individual
plaintiffs had standing because of the exclusion of their
relatives.97 Even if, barring hostility to religion, a president
has the authority to issue a ban on entry into the United
States of the sort under question here, it seems that a
separate question remains over whether the constitutional
rights of the plaintiffs were violated if the motivation for the
passage of the law was unconstitutional hostility against the
religion of the plaintiffs and/or the plaintiffs’ relatives.
97. Id. at 2416.
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Third, in looking at Roberts’ second quote, the single
piece of data he dismisses (the fact that “[p]laintiffs and the
dissent nonetheless emphasize that five of the seven nations
currently included in the Proclamation have Muslimmajority populations”) is portrayed in a manner implying
that this was the only or primary piece of evidence put
forward by the dissent that there was hostility to religion,
but this radically underdetermines the evidence put forward
by Breyer and especially the evidence put forward by
Sotomayor, both of whom outline multiple reasons for
concluding that the ban on entry was motivated by hostility
toward religion.
Fourth, in his second quote Roberts seems to be arguing
merely that on its face the proclamation appears neutral to
religion. But this seems to run counter to the principle put
forward by Kennedy in Lukumi that “the Free Exercise
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is
masked as well as overt.”98 While Roberts doesn’t cite to
Lukumi at all, it is one of the first citations in both Breyer
and Sotomayor’s dissents and provides an important part of
why both Sotomayor and Breyer frame the case very
differently than Roberts.
Citing Lukumi and Masterpiece, Breyer frames the heart
of the issue in his dissent as follows: “If its [the ban’s]
promulgation or content was significantly affected by
religious animus against Muslims, it would violate the
relevant statute or the First Amendment itself.”99 Breyer’s
dissent then consists of looking at different potential sources
of evidence for the claim that there was religious animus
against Muslims. Breyer concludes his dissent with a twotiered conclusion. First, Breyer concludes as follows.

98. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534. Given that this was Kennedy’s test, it also
strikes me as jurisprudentially mysterious that Kennedy signed on to Roberts’
opinion. I say “jurisprudentially” mysterious, because sadly the matter is less
politically mysterious, although just as troubling.
99. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2429 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Declarations, anecdotal evidence, facts, and numbers taken from
amicus briefs are not judicial factfindings. The Government has not
had an opportunity to respond, and a court has not had an
opportunity to decide. But, given the importance of the decision in
this case, the need for assurance that the Proclamation does not rest
upon a “Muslim ban,” and the assistance in deciding the issue that
answers to the “exemption and waiver” questions may provide, I
would send this case back to the District Court for further
proceedings. And, I would leave the injunction in effect while the
matter is litigated.100

However, Breyer also stakes a claim on how he would
rule should the Court have needed to decide the animus
question at that time writing that,
If this Court must decide the question without this further
litigation, I would, on balance, find the evidence of antireligious
bias, including statements on a website taken down only after the
President issued the two executive orders preceding the
Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, a sufficient basis to set the
Proclamation aside.101

Breyer’s dissent is important for several reasons. First,
at no point does Breyer reference “hostility.” Rather, he uses
phrases like “animus against religion” and “antireligious
bias” in a manner that seem to be treated as synonymous
with
“hostility
toward
religion.”
Second,
while
acknowledging that there is evidence of religious bias, his
first choice of action was to let the lower court make a finding
of fact concerning whether there was in fact bias present. Yet
he was comfortable ruling on the question of bias in the
Masterpiece case, where the same deference to letting a lower
court sort out the issue of fact could have been offered. It is
unclear whether Breyer saw Hawaii as relevantly different
from Masterpiece, or if Breyer’s view in Hawaii is indicative
of a shift away from his position in Masterpiece.
The most extensive discussion of hostility toward
religion in Hawaii occurs in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. As

100. Id. at 2433.
101. Id.
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in Roberts’ opinion and Breyer’s dissent, Sotomayor links
hostility to religion with both non-neutrality toward religion
and animus toward religion. For example, in her opening
paragraph she writes both that “[o]ur Founders honored that
core promise by embedding the principle of religious
neutrality in the First Amendment” and that “[b]ased on the
evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would conclude
that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim
animus. That alone suffices to show that plaintiffs are likely
to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause
claim.”102
While Roberts ignored Masterpiece and Breyer seemed to
deviate from his position in Masterpiece despite his
referencing the case, Sotomayor called out the stark
difference in treatment that claims of hostility toward
religion received in the Masterpiece majority compared to the
Hawaii majority, which was comprised of a subset of the
Masterpiece majority. Sotomayor admonishes the Court for
the quick change in perspective in the following paragraph.
Just weeks ago, the Court rendered its decision in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, which applied the bedrock principles of religious
neutrality and tolerance in considering a First Amendment
challenge to government action. Those principles should apply
equally here. In both instances, the question is whether a
government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reaching a
decision that affects individuals’ fundamental religious freedom.
But unlike in Masterpiece, where a state civil rights commission
was found to have acted without “the neutrality that the Free
Exercise Clause requires,” the government actors in this case will
not be held accountable for breaching the First Amendment’s
guarantee of religious neutrality and tolerance. Unlike in
Masterpiece, where the majority considered the state
commissioners’ statements about religion to be persuasive evidence
of unconstitutional government action, the majority here
completely sets aside the President’s charged statements about
Muslims as irrelevant. That holding erodes the foundational
principles of religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere has so
emphatically protected, and it tells members of minority religions
in our country that “they are outsiders, not full members of the

102. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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political community.”103

Sotomayor highlights a troublesome slipperiness that
seems to have invaded (or perhaps has always been present)
in the Court’s appeals to hostility toward religion. It strikes
me as worrisome that seven of the nine justices flipped sides
on what they considered a sufficient expression of hostility to
religion along partisan lines, and that even the two justices
who saw hostility as present in both cases, Breyer and
Kagan, suggested a different procedure for how that hostility
ought to be handled in the two cases. In Sotomayor’s case,
her switch in position alongside Ginsburg can be explained
both by an appeal to the precedent her colleagues set down
in Masterpiece and her view that the hostility in Hawaii was
more severe. However, it is harder to explain the change in
view of the five justice who remained in the majority for both
decisions.

103. Id. at 2435 (internal citations omitted).
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AMERICAN LEGION
The Court’s most recent appeal to hostility toward
religion occurred on June 20, 2019 when the Court delivered
its opinion in Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct.
2067 (2018). In American Legion, the Court held that the
presence of a ninety-year-old World War I memorial in the
form of a 32-foot Latin cross on public land in Maryland does
not violate the constitutional prohibition against
governmental establishment of religion.104 The concept of
hostility to religion does not taken center stage in this case
like it did in Masterpiece or in Sotomayor’s dissent in Hawaii.
However, the role that the concept of hostility toward
religion plays in this case puts on prime display the harmful
way in which the ambiguity over the meaning of hostility to
religion has left the concept overly malleable and ripe for
cooption for partisan ends.
Justice Samuel Alito wrote the opinion for the Court in
American Legion. Alito’s opinion relies heavily on the idea
found in the Court’s precedent that symbols with religious
origins can nevertheless gain additional secular meanings
and purposes over time in the right contexts.105 The bulk of
Alito’s opinion is devoted to supporting two conclusions.
First, Alito argues that the Lemon test for assessing whether
an action violates the Establishment Clause ought not apply
in cases like American Legion.106 Second, Alito argues that
the cross in American Legion represents one of those
instances where a symbol with a religious origin took on a
secular meaning of historical importance.107 On these
grounds, Alito concludes that the presence of the cross on
public land is “fully consistent” with the aim of the “Religion

104. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018).
105. Id. at 2082–83 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 688–90 (2005)
and McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 845 (2005)).
106. Id. at 2080–87 (discussing the applicability of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) to the issue at hand).
107. See id. at 2085–87, 2089.
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Clauses of the Constitution.”108
Alito not only makes the case that keeping the cross up
and intact is consistent with the First Amendment. He also
implies that removing the cross would be inconsistent with
the First Amendment because the removal of the cross
“would be seen by many not as a neutral act but as the
manifestation of a hostility toward religion that has no place
in our Establishment Clause traditions.”109 It is in making
this latter point that Alito relies on the concept of hostility to
religion. As we will see, he is clearly using “hostility towards
religion” as “non-neutral toward religion.” However, given
his interest in the appearances of hostility and neutrality by
the American people, he also doesn’t seem to be using the
phrase “hostility to religion” in a technical sense.
To see more clearly what I mean, it will be useful to have
before us Alito’s references to “neutrality” and “hostility” in
his opinion. Alito first mentions both neutrality and hostility
in the introductory paragraphs of his opinion stating that
“removal or radical alteration [of the cross] at this date would
be seen by many not as a neutral act but as the manifestation
of a hostility toward religion that has no place in our
Establishment Clause traditions.”110 This is noteworthy for
the aforementioned reason that it contrasts hostility to
neutrality. But it is also significant because it is ultimately
not a statement about what is neutral or hostile to religion
but about what “would be seen by many” as non-neutral and
hostile. It is a claim about appearances and perception.
(Perhaps those perceptions track reality, but it is reasonable
to think that acceptance of this connection ought to be argued
for.)
This focus on appearance of non-neutrality and hostility
remain the focus of Alito’s references of the topic. And Alito’s
108. Id. at 2074.
109. Id. (internal quotation marks removed) (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at
704).
110. Id.
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points often are speculative claims about what may be
viewed as non-neutral to partial portions of the population.
For example, Alito next references neutrality stating
that “when time’s passage imbues a religiously expressive
monument, symbol, or practice with . . . familiarity and
historical significance, removing it may no longer appear
neutral.”111 He once again follows this up with a connection
to hostility, writing that a “government that roams the land,
tearing down monuments with religious symbolism and
scrubbing away any reference to the divine will strike many
as aggressively hostile to religion.”112
Alito does not reference hostility again directly, but he
does make two more references to neutrality. He next
references neutrality, writing that “as World War I
monuments have endured through the years and become a
familiar part of the physical and cultural landscape,
requiring their removal would not be viewed by many as a
neutral act.”113 And in closing his opinion Alito writes the
following.
For many of these people, destroying or defacing the Cross that has
stood undisturbed for nearly a century would not be neutral and
would not further the ideals of respect and tolerance embodied in
the First Amendment. For all these reasons, the Cross does not
offend the Constitution.114

It is only here at the very end of his opinion that Alito
closes the gap between the possibility that removal of the
cross would appear non-neutral to a portion of the
population, to his conclusion that the presence of the cross
does not offend the Constitution.
Alito’s opinion in American Legion is instructive of two
problematic aspects around the Court’s appeals to hostility

111. Id. at 2084 (emphasis added).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 2086 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 2090.

700

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

toward religion in constitutional cases. First, it continues the
unacknowledged and increasingly frenetic swing between
the Court’s usage of hostility as akin to animosity, as found
in Kennedy’s Masterpiece opinion and Sotomayor’s Hawaii
dissent and hostility as akin to mere non-neutrality, as was
the case in Alito’s American Legion opinion.
Second, Alito’s opinion showcases the role that
ideological and partisan bias can play in assessments of
neutrality or hostility to religion. Alito is diligent in
assessing what may appear non-neutral or hostile to religion
among those portions of the population that want the cross
left up, but he never acknowledges the obvious fact that there
are also Americans who clearly find the presence of the cross
non-neutral to religion. This perception of non-neutrality is
at the heart of what motivated the lawsuit by the American
Humanist Association to begin with. Alito has implicitly
adopted the principle that perceptions of an action being nonneutral to religion are a reason to view it as non-neutral to
religion.
However, such a principle will consistently lead to
inconsistent results whenever one portion of the population
views an action as non-neutral to religion while another
portion of the population views failure to do that action as
non-neutral to religion. In the case at hand, this
inconsistency went overlooked because Alito focused only on
what might appear non-neutral to those in favor of the cross
staying up: a portion of the population that is likely
disproportionately comprised by individuals who adhere to
the United States’ majority religion, Christianity, and as a
result likely disproportionately excludes members of
minority religions and the non-religious. When the
perspectives of some are attended to in a way that the
perspectives of others are not, and when such attention
correlates with religious belief, this bakes non-neutrality
right into the assessment of Establishment Clause
violations.
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REFORMS GOING FORWARD
Having covered a thorough presentation of the history of
the Court’s appeals to hostility to religion in First
Amendment jurisprudence, it is time to take stock of what
we’ve seen and to provide some recommendations for the way
forward. Given the significant role that the concept of
hostility of religion played in three high profile cases in the
last two years alone, it is high time that more scrutiny be
given as to how the Court has employed the concept and what
it ought to do moving forward.
In this closing section, I offer four suggestions dealing
with how the Supreme Court should refine its jurisprudence
concerning appeals to hostility toward religion. These
suggestions are based on what’s been discovered in this
paper about the Court’s practices heretofore. Part of my
motivation for suggesting these modifications is that the
Court’s appeals to hostility to religion have run parallel to
discussions about hostility to religion in the larger political
arena. As the language of the Court and summaries of the
Court’s opinions get disseminated into the wider culture, the
quasi-technical sense of “hostility to religion” as any form of
non-neutrality to religion is apt to be lost, and the strong and
vigorous war-like connotations of the term “hostility” are apt
to take center stage. What is lost in translation between
Court opinions and the wider culture runs the risk of stoking
the
culture
wars
and
contributing
to
public
misunderstanding of difficult jurisprudential issues.
A thorough examination of appeals to “hostility to
religion” in the public square would require far more space
than would be prudent to include in this Article. However,
before getting to my proposed modifications to the Court’s
jurisprudence, I want to offer two anecdotes of the
phenomenon of appeals to hostility to religion being
disseminated into the broader cultural conversation around
the relationship between religion and state.
First, in 1984, when President Ronald Reagan was
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advocating passage of a constitutional amendment that
would allow organized prayer in public schools, the Los
Angeles Times reported on the story with the headline
“Reagan Pushes School Prayer: Says Government Must End
Hostility to Religion.” The opening line of the article reads as
follows. “Declaring that government must change its
‘hostility to religion,’ President Reagan said Tuesday that a
constitutional amendment allowing organized vocal prayer
in public schools ‘would do more than any other action to
reassert the faith and values that made America great.’”115
Figuring out whether prominent culture references to
“hostility to religion” predate the Court’s uses of the phrase
or if it’s the other way around is a sort of chicken and egg
question that for the purposes of this paper doesn’t need to
be answered. But the point here is that Reagan couched his
call for action specifically as a response to “hostility to
religion.” In this wider cultural conversation around the
proper relationship between church and state where the
audience doesn’t have the same nuanced exposure to how the
phrase has been used in Supreme Court jurisprudence, such
audiences are apt to take judicial rulings declaring “hostility
to religion” at face value using the ordinary meaning of the
phrase. Thus, the Court has the power—even if at points it
is wielding the power unwittingly—to stoke or dampen the
culture wars over what it identifies as hostility to religion by
legitimatizing and sanctioning viewing certain acts as
exhibiting “hostility to religion.”
The second anecdote shows even more clearly the
difficulties that the mismatch between the Court’s quasitechnical definition of “hostility to religion” and the more
ordinary meaning of that phrase can cause for those
speaking about legal issues about church and state in the
public square. At the end of the Court’s 1996–1997 term,
Harvard Professor Mary Ann Glendon wrote an op-ed in the

115. George Skelton, Reagan Pushes School Prayer: Says Government Must
End Hostility to Religion, L.A. TIMES, (Mar. 7, 1984).
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New York Times discussing two of the Court’s end of year
rulings dealing with the Establishment Clause. In her op-ed
Professor Glendon, who believes the First Amendment’s
protection of freedom of religion is best viewed as a single
provision, wrote that “[i]n the 1940’s, several Justices, with
ill-disguised hostility to religion, set the two ‘clauses’ of the
First Amendment in opposition to each other.”116 In
response, New York University Law Professor, Nadine
Strossen, who was at the time the President of the American
Civil Liberties Union, wrote a letter to the editor arguing
that “Mary Ann Glendon perpetuates a widespread myth as
dangerous as it is false when she equates vigorous
enforcement of the Establishment Clause with ‘hostility to
religion’ . . . . In the words of former Supreme Court Justice
Harry Blackmun, ‘nothing could be further from the truth’
than to ‘misperceive a respect for religious pluralism, a
respect commanded by the Constitution, as hostility or
indifference to religion.’”117
It seems to me quite likely that Glendon and Strossen
were expressing a genuine difference of opinion that
attentiveness as to the proper meaning of “hostility to
religion” on its own would not have solved. Yet, the Court’s
disparate treatment of what it means by “hostility to
religion” adds fuels to the disagreement and obscures the
meaning of their claims. After all, Strossen explicitly appeals
to the Court’s precedent in her response, and Glendon, who
is a leading scholar in Constitutional freedom of religion, no
doubt has had her understanding of what constitutes
hostility toward religion shaped by the Court’s precedent.
But all this is likely lost for most New York Times readers
who will be tapping into only the common connotations of the

116. Mary Ann Glendon, Religious Freedom and Common Sense, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/30/opinion/religious-freedomand-common-sense.html.
117. Nadine Strossen, Religious Hostility Myth, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 1997),
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/04/opinion/l-religious-hostility-myth-967777
.html.
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word “hostility” in interpreting the exchange between
Strossen and Glendon.
The suggestions that follow thus aim at improving the
Court’s jurisprudence on two levels. First, the suggestions
are meant to help make the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence clearer and more coherent. Second, the
suggestions are meant to help improve the expressive value
and expressive effectiveness of the Court’s decisions about
religious freedom to the wider public.118 The suggestions are
as follows.
First, the Court should begin adopting language that
acknowledges the distinction between all that which is nonneutral to religion versus that which actively exhibits
animosity toward religion. Using “hostility to religion” as a
contrast class to “neutrality toward religion” (or in the case
of Burger and Kennedy as a contrast class for that which
doesn’t “accommodate religion”) is a historical accident that
we don’t have any good reason to continue. Rather, the Court
can make its points clearer by using other language it has
historically appealed to in pointing out that something fails
to be neutral to religion. For example, justices can continue
to speak of that which disfavors or inhibits religion. From the
perspective of choosing language that best represents the
point, to say that the law ought to be neutral to religion is
better served by pointing out that laws should neither favor
nor disfavor religion or should neither advance nor inhibit
religion. There is no need to appeal to hostility to religion
when simply trying to make the point that a law which
disfavors or inhibits religion fails to be neutral to religion.
The reason for this is that when the point is that religion is
merely disfavored or inhibited by a law, what one needs to
convey is that religion is harmed by the law. The key point is
about the consequences to religion; not about the attitudes or

118. In defense of the expressive value of law, see, for example, RICHARD H.
MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS (2015); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
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aims of lawmakers or judges. When harmful consequences to
religion are the focus, using less loaded language like
disfavoring or inhibiting religion can make that clearer.
On the other hand, there are indeed instances in which
it is appropriate to call out active hostility against religion as
in Lukumi. In such cases, presumably the point the Court is
trying to make is one not just about consequences for
religion, but also about the attitude of the lawmakers or law
enforcers. In such a case the language of hostility is more
appropriate. However, even here if one wanted to avoid
getting entangled in the messy history of appeals to hostility
to religion by the Court, a lawyer or justice can use the
language such as “animosity” or “ill-will” instead of
“hostility.” Creating this linguistic bifurcation between two
concepts, both of which are currently picked out by the
phrase “hostility to religion,” would allow the Court to issue
clearer opinions.
Second, because “hostility” in its ordinary sense has
implications for the internal thoughts and attitudes of the
subject who is hostile, the Court would benefit from being
more cautious in attributing the attitude of hostility to others
when the evidence is indeterminate or ambiguous. The
Masterpiece case is a good example. Despite acknowledging
the underdetermination of the evidence, because Kennedy
viewed it as reasonable to interpret the evidence as a
manifestation of hostility on the part of the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, he imputed hostility to them. From the
vantage point of the ordinary use of the phrase, accusing a
lawmaker or adjudicator in a liberal democracy of being
hostile to religion is a weighty charge. It is an accusation that
should be levied judiciously. And it seems to me that when
hostility toward religion is but one reasonable interpretation
of the evidence, that levying an accusation of hostility toward
religion is imprudent. If the Court’s point in Masterpiece was
that the adjudication process was infiltrated with a lack of
guarantee of objectivity, there are ways to make this point
without attributing hostile bias to the parties in question.
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Alternatively, if the point was that there may have been bias
in the process based on appearances, a more fitting remedy
would seem to be remanding rather than simply
“invalidating” without further guidance or instruction.
Third, because of the ambiguity present in the Court’s
appeals to hostility to religion, it is unclear what exactly the
principle laid out in Lukumi and further applied in
Masterpiece is. What precisely did the Court mean when it
held that “the Free Exercise Clause protects against
governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt”? Is
this merely a tautological principle that cases like Lukumi
aren’t Smith-style cases because the relevant laws are not
neutral laws of general applicability and therefore hostile to
religion in the sense of “hostile” as “non-neutral”? Or was the
Court saying something more specific about how laws that
are neutral in application can still be found unconstitutional
if animosity toward religion motivated their passage? As of
right now, it’s not clear what the answer to this question is,
but the outcome of a future case could easily hang on this
distinction. If the Court clarifies what it means by “hostility
to religion” this can help sort out ambiguities involving
hostility to religion in the Court’s developing First
Amendment jurisprudence.
Fourth, if the Court is going to take into consideration
perceptions of hostility to religion as a salient factor in
determining what does and does not violate the
Establishment Clause, as the Court did in American Legion,
then the Court needs to be careful that it not only focus on
the perceptions of some portions of the population. If it
matters that some Christians will find taking down a cross
on public land to be hostile to their faith, it should matter
just as much that some Jews (and some other Christians for
that matter) will find keeping the cross up on public land
hostile to their faith or other faiths. The Court can’t pick and
choose whose perceptions of hostility matter.
In this paper, I’ve aimed to show how the development of
appeals to “hostility to religion” on the Supreme Court has
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contained much that is a product of chance and a lack of
careful definition. Given what the doctrine has grown into, it
is high time that the Court be more intentional in how it
makes these appeals. The suggestions I offered in this final
section provide a way to make that start.
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CONCLUSION
The recent trends exhibited in Masterpiece, Hawaii, and
American Legion suggest that the concept of hostility to
religion is waxing, not waning, in influence. And as the
significant public interest generated by these cases shows,
how the Court expresses its views in cases like these can
have an impact on how the relationship between church and
states is perceived on a broader cultural level. Heretofore,
the Court has not offered an explanation as to what
constitutes hostility to religion in its jurisprudence, and in
the absence of that explanation, problematic and ambiguous
uses of the term have arisen. This ambiguity and
inconsistency has left the concept ripe for manipulation by
justices desiring a particular outcome in cases in which the
concept plays a role. This potential for partisan harm can be
mitigated if the Court adopts a more precise meaning of
“hostility to religion” as referring to only that which points
out instances of active animosity to religion rather than as
all that is viewed as simply non-neutral toward religion.

